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We report on a statistical analysis of the engagement in the electoral processes of all Brazilian
cities by considering the number of party memberships and the number of candidates for mayor and
councillor. By investigating the relationships between the number of party members and the popu-
lation of voters, we have found that the functional form of these relationships are well described by
sub-linear power laws (allometric scaling) surrounded by a multiplicative log-normal noise. We have
observed that this pattern is quite similar to those previously-reported for the relationships between
the number candidates (mayor and councillor) and population of voters [EPL 96, 48001 (2011)],
suggesting that similar universal laws may be ruling the engagement in the electoral processes. We
also note that the power law exponents display a clear hierarchy, where the more influential is the
political position the smaller is the value of the exponent. We have also investigated the probability
distributions of the number of candidates (mayor and councilor), party memberships and voters.
The results indicate that the most influential positions are characterized by distributions with very
short-tails, while less influential positions display an intermediate power law decay before showing
an exponential-like cutoff. We discuss that, in addition to the political power of the position, limi-
tations in the number of available seats can also be connected with this changing of behavior. We
further believe that our empirical findings point out to an underrepresentation effect, where the
larger city is, the larger are the obstacles for more individuals to become directly engaged in the
electoral process.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Da (Systems obeying scaling laws) 89.65.-s (Social and economic systems) 89.75.-k
(Complex systems) 05.40.-a (Stochastic processes)
INTRODUCTION
The investigation of social systems is an increasing part
of the physicist agenda. In particular, technics and meth-
ods from statistical physics have proved to be very useful
for unveiling patterns and also for modeling social sys-
tems [1–5]. All these investigations are expected to pro-
vide a better understanding of the social processes in our
society and also to find manners of improve them. A re-
markable example are the electoral processes, which have
been extensively investigated in the past few years.
One of the pioneer works (in the statistical physics con-
text) dealing with elections data is due to Costa Filho et
al. [6, 7], where a power law distribution was proposed to
model the number of votes in Brazilian elections. These
works were followed by several efforts aiming to model
the power law behaviors [8–10] and also to propose bet-
ter fits [11]. However, Fortunato and Castellano [12] were
the first to investigate the question of universality in the
distribution of votes. After analyzing a larger dataset of
elections, they concluded that a universal log-normal dis-
tribution emerges when considering the number of votes
received by the parties. On the other hand, this uni-
versally was shown to be not valid for Brazilian elec-
tions [13] and, recently, this and other discrepancies were
attributed to differences in the election rules among coun-
tries [14]. There were also studies showing a tendency of
polarization of the voters in mayoral elections [15, 16] and
that elections act as a process of information aggrega-
tion in which the elected candidates are characterized by
a more homogeneous profile [17]. The electoral turnout
rates [18–20], an approach for detecting fraud in elec-
tions [21], the role of social networks on elections [22], the
evolution of political organizations [23] were also studied.
In spite of elections being currently an effervescent
topic, there are still many important questions related to
this complex social process that remain without a proper
answer. There is no overstatement in affirming that sci-
entists are just beginning to extract quantitive knowledge
and also to discover applications for their results in the
electoral process. One of these questions is related to
the motivations that carry individuals to directly engage
in the electoral process by becoming candidate or po-
litical party member. We started to discuss some of
these questions in Ref. [24], where we reported that the
relationships between the number of candidates (mayor
and councilor) and the population of voters are described
by power laws surrounded by a multiplicative log-normal
noise. Here, we report that the same patterns are ob-
served when investigating the relationships between the
number of party memberships and the population of vot-
ers. These new findings and those previously-reported
thus suggest that the engagement in electoral processes
is ruled by similar laws. In addition to this universal be-
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2havior, we have observed that the power law exponents
display a clear hierarchy where the more influential is the
political position the smaller is the value of the power law
exponent. We further have calculated the distributions of
the number of candidates (mayor and councilor), number
of party memberships and number of voters. The results
show that short tail distributions appear for the most
influential political positions and that less influential po-
sitions display an intermediate power law decay.
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
We have accessed electoral data of all Brazilian cities
made free available by the Brazilian electoral supreme
court [25] and population of voters also made free avail-
able by the Brazilian institute of geography and statis-
tics [26]. The electoral data consist of the number of
party memberships from all the 27 Brazilian political par-
ties in each city and for the year 2006, 2008 and 2011.
The population of voters was collect to match the years
of the data of the number of party memberships. Along
the period covering our data, the number of cities have
almost not changed (5,564 in 2006 and 5,565 in 2011)
and the number of political parties was constant. For
shake of convenience, let V denote the population of vot-
ers and N be the number of candidates or the number of
party memberships. In addition, we have also collected
the same Brazilian data used in Ref. [24] for investigat-
ing the relationships between number of candidates and
population of voters.
Following our previous work [24], we first studied the
relationships between log10N and log10 V . Figure 1
shows a scatter plot of the logarithm of the number of
party memberships versus the logarithm of the number
of voters. We note that despite there being fluctuations,
a power law tendency is observable. In order to overcome
the fluctuations, we have binned the data in w windows
equally spaced in log10 V and evaluated the average value
of log10N and log10 V within each window. The circles
in Fig. 1 represent these average values where we clearly
notice the average power law relationship, that is, the
linear fit
〈log10N〉 = A+ α log10 V (1)
describes quite well the average values in these log-log
scale. It is worth to remark that the values of A and α
practically do not change when varying the number of
windows.
In order to check whether values of α are dependent
on time, we have evaluated the average power laws for all
years in our database. Figure 2 shows this analysis (that
is, average of log10N versus average of log10 V ) where
we note that the value of α practically does not chance
in time. In particular, we have found α = 0.87 ± 0.02,
α = 0.86± 0.02 and α = 0.85± 0.02 respectively for the
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Scatter plot of the relationships
between log10N (population of voters) and log10 V (number
of party memberships) when considering data from the year
of 2008. We note that the relationship is approximated by
power law tendency surrounded by fluctuations. Here, the
green small dots are the values of log10N and log10 V for each
city and the circles are the average values of these points after
binning the data in w windows equally spaced in log10 V . The
dashed line is a linear fit to these average values and the power
law exponent is shown in the plot. The simulated results
from Eq. (3) are represented by gray dots, which produce the
window average values indicated by the gray squares.
years 2006, 2008 and 2011. Thus, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the values of α are constant over time
after taking the standard errors of α into account.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average power law relationships be-
tween log10N (population of voters) and log10 V (number of
party memberships). Note that we have analyzed all the years
in our database and the values of α (the slope of these curves)
practically do not change in time. The average value of α is
shown in the plot and the dashed line represents a power law
with this exponent. The gray squares represent the simulated
results from Eq. (3).
In addition to the average values, we have also studied
the fluctuations around the power law tendencies. We
have calculated the variance σ2 of log10N within each
window as a function of average value of log10 V . Fig-
3ure 3(a) shows that these variances are almost a con-
stant function of log10 V and that there is no clear tem-
poral evolution for their average values. The average
value of the variance over log10 V and over the years is
0.027± 0.002.
Still following our previous work, we have also in-
vestigated the distributions of the fluctuations around
the power law tendencies by considering the normalized
residuals
ξ(V ) =
log10N(V )− 〈log10N〉
σ
, (2)
where σ is the standard deviation of log10N evaluated
within the windows. Figure 3(b) shows the distributions
of ξ where we have found that the Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and unitary variance describes quite well
the empirical distributions for all the data. In particular,
after applying the Pearson chi-squared hypothesis test,
we have concluded that normality cannot be rejected for
all years.
Based on the previous results, we thus concluded the
patterns exhibit by relationships between the number of
party memberships and the population of voters are quite
similar to those we have reported for the relationships be-
tween number of candidates (mayor and councilor) and
population of voters [24]. Furthermore, as we have previ-
ously proposed, all these empirical findings can be mod-
eled by the following stochastic-like equation
N = A η(V )V α , (3)
where A is a constant, η(V ) is a stochastic noise and α
is the power law exponent of the relationship between
N and V . Notice that if we apply the logarithm in
both sides of Eq. (3) and compare the results with the
Eqs. (1) and (2), we will figure out that log10A = A,
log10 η(V ) = σ ξ(V ) and 〈ξ(V )〉 = 0. We further ob-
serve that since ξ(V ) is normally distributed, η(V ) must
be distributed according to a lognormal distribution.
Thus, Eq. (3) represents a multiplicative stochastic pro-
cess driven by a lognormal noise. An analogous behav-
ior was also reported for scaling laws in crime data [27],
which reinforces the universally of our empirical finding.
We have simulated the Eq. (3) by considering the aver-
age values of α and σ. The simulation results are shown
in Figs. 1, 2 and 3 by gray squares. We note that Eq. 3
describes quite well all the empirical findings we have
reported.
THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL POSITION
We have thus identified patterns in the engagement
in the electoral processes that seem to hold for different
political positions. From number of party memberships
(reported here) to number of councilor and mayor candi-
dates (reported in Ref. [24]), the empirical findings have
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Fluctuations around the power law
tendencies. (a) Variance σ2 of the values of log10N ver-
sus 〈log10 V 〉 evaluated after binning the data in w windows
equally spaced in log10 V . We note the almost constant value
of σ2 over the population of voters. The horizontal dashed
line is the average value of σ2 over log10 V and over the years
(0.027 ± 0.002). (b) Distribution of the normalized residuals
(ξ) around the power law tendencies. The dashed line is the
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unitary variance.
In both plots, the gray squares represent the simulated results
from Eq. (3).
shown that a robust average scaling law with the pop-
ulation of voters emerges and that the fluctuations sur-
rounding this average tendency have an almost constant
variance and a log-normal distribution. However, within
this universal behavior we can also verify that the power
law exponents α enabled us to distinguish the different
political positions. By comparing the average value of
the power law exponent reported here for the number
of party memberships to those previously-reported for
councilors and mayor candidates, we observe that there
is a clear hierarchy for the values of α, as shown in Fig. 4.
Moreover, we also note that the more influential is the
political position, the smaller is the value of α. This re-
sult may connected to the number of available seats for
each of these political positions: there is only one mayor
in each city, 9 councilors in cities with less than 47,600
4inhabitants and, in principle, the only limitation for the
number of party memberships of a city is its population
of voters. The case of party memberships is thus very in-
triguing, since in the lack of restrictions we could expect
N to be linear with the population of voters V . In addi-
tion to number of seats, the fact that some parties are not
represented in small towns may help to limit the number
of candidates. This limitation however should affect more
the number of mayor candidates, since it is not possible
to have more than one mayor candidate from the same
party in a given city; meanwhile, there is no such limita-
tion for councilor candidates and for party memberships.
The case of party memberships is not even conditioned to
presence of parties in a city. Thus, the intrinsic sub-linear
behavior and the fact that α becomes much smaller than
one for the most influential political positions may be
in somehow connected to a kind of underrepresentation
effect, that is, larger cities may not provide the neces-
sary conditions for more individuals to become directly
engaged in the electoral process.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The role of the political positions. Av-
erage values of the power law exponents α for each political
position. The exponents of the relationships between number
of councilor and mayor candidates and the population of vot-
ers were obtained from Ref. [24]. We note that the average of
α is smaller for the more influential political positions. The
error bars are standard deviations from the mean value of α.
Another intriguing behavior is observed when we cal-
culate the probability distributions of the numbers of
mayor candidates, councilor candidates, party member-
ships, and voters. Figure 5 shows the cumulative distri-
butions of these numbers. We note that for mayor and
councilor candidates the distributions are characterized
by short tails that can be approximated by exponentials
decays. On the other hand, for party memberships and
voters the distributions exhibit an intermediate behavior
that can be approximated by power law decays (dashed
lines in Fig. 5) before showing an exponential-like cut-
off. This changing of behavior may be connected to the
limitation in the number of available seats, where expo-
nentials decays appear for positions with limited number
of seats (mayor and councilor) and approximate power
law decays appear for positions in which there is no clear
limitations in the number of seats (party memberships
and voters). Actually, because voting is compulsory in
Brazil, the number of voters can be thought as the frac-
tion of population that is older than 18 years and, in fact,
we have verified that number of voters increases linearly
with the population size.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Cumulative distributions of the num-
ber of mayor candidates (circles), councilor candidates (di-
amonds), party memberships (triangles), and population of
voters (squares) when considering data from the year 2008
(very similar distributions are obtained for the other years).
We note the shift of the distributions with the increasing in
the number of available seats. We further observe that the
distributions for mayor and councilor are characterized by
exponential asymptotic behavior, while the distributions for
party memberships and voters display an approximate power
law behavior before showing an exponential-like cutoff. The
dashed lines show the regions where the distributions can be
approximated by power laws (the exponents are shown in the
plot).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the engagement in the
electoral process in all Brazilian cities by taking into ac-
count the number of party memberships and the number
of candidates for mayor and councillor. We have shown
that an average power law relationship surrounded by a
multiplicative log-normal noise emerges when investigat-
ing the relationships between the number of party mem-
berships and population of voters. We also observed that
the same behavior was previously-reported for the re-
lationships between the number candidates (mayor and
councilor) and population of voters. When comparing
the value of the power law exponents, we have found a
clear hierarchy of values where the most influential posi-
tions display the smaller values for the power law expo-
nents. We have also evaluated the probability distribu-
tions of the number of candidates (mayor and councilor),
5party memberships and voters. The results have pointed
out that the most influential positions (mayor and coun-
cilor) are characterized by distributions with very short-
tails, while less influential positions (party memberships)
display an intermediate power law decay. We have ar-
gued that, in addition to the political power of the po-
sition, limitations in the number of available seats may
also be connected with this changing of behavior. We fur-
ther believe that the strong sub-linear behavior and the
exponential-like cutoff provide clues pointing out to an
underrepresentation effect, where the larger city is, the
larger are the obstacles for more individuals to become
directly engaged in the electoral process.
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